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We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We 
focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the 
signal for monitoring a player’s action does not depend on the other player’s action. 
Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in this class, according to which each player’s 
action in each period depends only on the signal for the opponent’s action one period 
before. With almost perfect monitoring, we show that even if the discount factors are 
fixed low, efficiency is approximated by a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoff vector. 
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1. Introduction 
  We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games with discounting. We assume 
that monitoring is imperfect in that each player cannot observe the opponent’s action 
choice but can imperfectly monitor it by observing a noisy signal. This signal is 
randomly determined according to the probability function conditional on the 
opponent’s action choice. We also assume that monitoring is private in that the signals 
that each player observes cannot be observed by the opponent. 
We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable 
and the signals for monitoring any player’s action choices are independent of the other 
player’s action choices. With this class restriction, we investigate the possibility that 
efficiency is approximated by a Nash equilibrium payoff vector when monitoring is 
almost perfect, and we arrive at the following affirmative answer. In the case of almost 
perfect private monitoring, there exists a simple tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium that 
approximately induces efficiency, according to which, each player’s action choice in 
each period depends only on the signal for the opponent’s action choice one period 
before. The main contribution of this paper is that this positive result holds even if the 
discount factor is fixed and not very high. 
It is well known that if each player perfectly monitors the opponent’s action   3
choices and the discount factor is not very low, efficiency is achieved by a Nash 
equilibrium. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). In 
order to clarify the robustness with respect to monitoring ability, it is important to 
answer the question of whether efficiency is approximated by a Nash equilibrium payoff 
vector if monitoring is almost perfect but imperfect. In the case of public monitoring 
where the signals are observable to both players, it is now not difficult to answer in the 
affirmative due to previous works such as Green and Porter (1984); Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stachetti (1990), and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1986). In the case of private 
monitoring, however, this robustness issue remains unresolved and is much more 
substantial. 
In fact, the previous works have given only partial answers for the private 
monitoring case. First, Sekiguchi (1997) showed an example in which efficiency can be 
approximated by a Nash equilibrium payoff vector when monitoring is almost perfect. 
Sekiguchi demonstrated an idea of construction with public randomization, which 
allowed equilibrium strategies to depend on histories in a non-recursive manner. Ely 
and Valimaki (2002) and Piccione (2002) demonstrated another idea of construction on 
the basis of recursive Markovian techniques, which was applicable to a class of games 
wider than that presented in Sekiguchi. By constructing Markovian strategies to which   4
both the cooperative and non-cooperative actions are the best responses at all times, 
they showed that efficiency is approximated by a Nash equilibrium payoff vector when 
the discount factor is very close to unity. However, this result is not satisfactory because 
their proofs crucially depend on the assumption of almost no discounting. Hence, the 
robustness is regarded as an open question in the case when the discount factor is fixed 
and not very high. This is the main theme of this paper. 
With our class restriction, by using only tit-for-tat strategies instead of the more 
complicated Markovian ones, we can demonstrate the same result as that shown by Ely, 
Valimaki, and Piccione. Tit-for-tat Nash equilibria have a useful property that the least 
upper bound of tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player is independent of the 
discount factor. This implies that whenever the approximate efficiency holds with 
almost no discounting, then this holds even if the discount factor is not very high. This 
is precisely what we will show as the main theorem. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
defines tit-for-tat strategies. In Section 4, we characterize the tit-for-tat Nash equilibria 
and the least upper bounds. Section 5 presents the main theorem. Finally, Section 6 
considers an example where we argue the degree of implicit collusion sustained in the 
long run by introducing the concept of stationary distribution of action profiles.   5
 
2. The Model 
A two-person component game is defined by  {1,2} (,) ii i Au ∈ , where  i A  denotes the 
finite set of actions for each player  {1, 2} i∈ ,  ii aA ∈ ,  12 AAA ≡ × ,  12 (,) aa a A ≡∈ , 
: i uA R → , and  ( ) i ua is the payoff for player  i when the players choose the action 
profile  aA ∈ . Let  : [0,1] ii A α →  denote a mixed action for player  i. Let  i ∆  denote 
the set of mixed actions for player  i. 
Two noisy signals  11 ω ∈Ω  and  22 ω ∈Ω  occur after the players’ action choices, 
where  i Ω  denotes the finite set of possible  i ω ,  12 (,) ω ωω = , and  12 Ω=Ω ×Ω . A 
signal profile ω∈Ω is randomly determined according to the probability function 
(| ) : f aR + ⋅Ω →  conditional  on aA ∈ . Let  ( | ) ( | )
jj




≡ ∑ , where  j i ≠ . 
We assume that the payoff functions are additively separable, i.e., 
    () ( ) ( ) ii i i j ua va wa =+  for  all  {1, 2} i∈  and  all aA ∈ , 
where : ii vA R →  and  : ij wA R → . We assume that  ( | ) ii f a ω  does not  depend on 
j a . We write  ( | ) iii f a ω  instead of  ( | ) ii f a ω  and call  ii ω ∈Ω   the signal for player 
's i  action choice. An economic situation relevant to our model is the voluntary 
contribution of public goods. The players supply their public goods that are perfectly 
differentiated each other. An action  ii aA ∈  for each player  i implies the amount of   6
public good that player  i produces. The production cost for player  's i  public good is 
given by  ( ) ii va − . Player  's i  benefit from opponent  's j  public good is given by 
() ij wa . 
Fix  1 A ,  2 A ,  1 Ω , and  2 Ω  arbitrarily. We define an infinitely repeated game by 
{1,2} (,,) iii i ufδ ∈ Γ≡ , where  (0,1) i δ ∈  denotes the discount factor for player i . We 
allow the players to have different discount factors. Let  1 () ( () , () )
t ht a τ τω τ = =  denote a 
history up to period t , where  12 () ( () , () ) aa a A τ ττ = ∈ , and let 
12 () ( () , () ) ω τω τ ω τ =∈ Ω  denote the action profile and the signal profile in period  t, 
respectively. Let  { ( )| 0,1,...} Hh t t == denote the set of histories, where  (0) h  is the 
null history. A strategy for player  {1,2} i∈  is defined as  : ii H σ →∆ , where 
(( 1 ) ) i ht σ −  is the mixed action for player  i in period t when  ( 1) ht−  occurs. Let 
12 (,) σ σσ =  denote a strategy profile. The payoff for player  i induced by σ  in Γ 
is given by 
1
1
() ( 1 )[ (( ) ) |,]
t






≡− Γ ∑ , where  [| , ] E σ ⋅ Γ  denotes the 
expectation when the players conform to  σ  in Γ. Let  i Σ   denote the set of strategies 
for player  i. A strategy profile  σ   is said to be a Nash equilibrium in  Γ if 
() ( , ) ii i j vv σ σσ ′ ≥  for  all  {1, 2} i∈  and  all  ii σ′∈Σ . 
If monitoring is imperfect and private, i.e., each player observes only the signal for 
the opponent’s action choice, it is appropriate to replace the set of strategies  i Σ  with  a   7
subset  ˆ
ii Σ⊂ Σ that is defined as the set of strategies  i σ  such that  ( ( )) i ht σ  is 
independent of  ( ( ), ( )) ji a τ ωτ  for all  {1,..., } t τ ∈ . Let  12 ˆˆˆ Σ =Σ ×Σ . A strategy profile 
ˆ σ ∈Σ   is said to be a Nash equilibrium in Γ   with private monitoring if 
() ( , ) ii i j vv σ σσ ′ ≥  for all  {1,2} i∈  and all  ˆ
ii σ′∈Σ . Clearly, a  strategy profile is a 
Nash equilibrium in  Γ  with private monitoring if it is a Nash equilibrium in  Γ. 
 
3. Tit-For-Tat Equilibria 
For each  {1,2} i∈ , we arbitrarily fix two actions 
*
ii aA ∈  and 
**
ii aA ∈  for player 
i. Let 
** *
12 (,) aa aA =∈  and 
** ** **
12 (,) aa aA = ∈ . We assume that the action profile 
* a  
is  efficient in that 
**
121 2 () () ( ) ( ) ua ua ua ua +≥ +  for all aA ∈ . Further, we assume 
that for every  {1,2} i∈ , 
** * () ( ) ii ii va va <  and 
** * () ( ) ij ij wa wa > , i.e., 
(1)    
** * (,) ( ,) ii j ii j uaa ua a <  and 
** * (, ) (, ) ii j ii j uaa uaa >  for  all aA ∈ . 
In the voluntary contributions of public goods, this assumption implies that player  i is 
producing 
*
i a  at a higher cost than 
**
i a  but in a manner more beneficial to opponent 
j . 
We consider strategies that are tit-for-tat in that 
(i)   each  player  i only  chooses 
*
i a  and 
**
i a   at all times, and 
(ii)   each  player  's i   mixed action in any period  2 t ≥  depends  only on the signal   8
(1 ) j t ω −  for  opponent  's j   action choice in the previous period  1 t − . 
Formally, a strategy  i σ  for each player  {1,2} i∈  is said to be tit-for-tat if for every 
1 t ≥  and  every  ( 1) ht H −∈ , 
(( 1 ) ) ( ) 0 ii ht a σ −=  for  all 
** * \{ , } iii i aAa a ∈  
and for every  2 t ≥ , every  ( 1) ht H −∈, and every  ( 1) \{ ( 1)} ht H h t ′ − ∈− , 
(( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) ii ht h t σ σ ′ −= − whenever  (1 ) (1 ) jj tt ω ω′ − =− . 
A tit-for-tat strategy  i σ   is represented by  ( , ) ii qs where  [0,1] i q ∈ ,  :[ 0 , 1 ] ij s Ω→ , 
* (( 0 ) ) ( ) ii i haq σ = , 
** (( 0 ) ) ( ) 1 ii i ha q σ = − , 
for every  2 t ≥  and  every  ( 1) ht H −∈ , 
* ( ( ))( ) 1 ( ( )) iii j ht a s t σω =− , and 
** ( ( ))( ) ( ( )) ii i j ht a s t σω = . 
According to ( , ) ii qs, player i chooses action 
*
i a  (action 
**
i a ) with probability  i q  
(probability 1 i q − ) in period 1 and action 
*
i a  (action 
**
i a ) with probability  () ij s ω  
(probability  1( ) ij s ω − ) if he/she observes  j ω  one period before. Note that any 
tit-for-tat strategy for player  i  belongs to the subset  ˆ
i Σ . 
Let ( , ) qs  denote a tit-for-tat strategy profile, where  12 (, ) qq q =  and  12 (, ) ss s = . 
We confine our attention to the tit-for-tat Nash equilibria  ( , ) qs in Γ such that each 
player  i  chooses 
*
i a  with  positive probabilities in every period  2 t ≥ , i.e., 
(( ) )0 ij st ω >  for some  jj ω ∈Ω . Note that the necessary and sufficient condition for a   9
tit-for-tat strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium in  Γ is that each player has no 
incentive to choose any other tit-for-tat strategy. Hence, it follows that a tit-for-tat 
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in  Γ  with private monitoring if and only if it is a 
Nash equilibrium in  Γ. The set of tit-for-tat Nash equilibria also remains unchanged 




  The definition of tit-for-tat strategies, along with the assumptions on the payoff 
functions and the signals in Section 3, implies that in every period t, the incentive 
constraint of Nash equilibrium for each player  i is irrelevant to the history other than 
(1 ) j t ω − ; further, each player  ' is current action  ( ) i at influences opponent  ' js  
mixed action  (() ) j ht σ  in the next period  1 t +  through the determination of  ( ) i t ω . 
Since each player  ' is  choice of 
*
i a  is at all times one of the best responses to any 
tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ( , ) qs, it follows that for every  {1,2} i∈ , 
(2)    
** * (,) ( ) ( 1 ) { ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) } ii i j i jj i j vq s va q wa qwa δ =+ − + −  
** * [()() ( ) { 1 () } ](|)
ii




++ − ∑ , 
and that the incentive constraint is replaced with the maximization of   10
(3)     ** * () [()() ( ) { 1 () } ]( |)
ii




++ − ∑  
with respect to  ii aA ∈ . The definition of tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium automatically 
implies that both 
*
i a  and 
**
i a  maximize this value. Hence, we have proved the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: A tit-for-tat strategy profile  (,) q s  is a Nash equilibrium in  Γ if and 
only if for every  {1, 2} i∈ , 
(4)     ** * * * ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ){1 ( )}] ( | )
ii




++ − ∑  
** * ** ** ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ){1 ( )}] ( | )
ii




=+ + − ∑ , 
and for every  ii aA ∈ , 
** * * * ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ){1 ( )}] ( | )
ii




++ − ∑  
** * () [()() ( ) { 1 () } ]( |)
ii




≥+ + − ∑ . 
 
  From Proposition 1, it follows that there exists a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium in  Γ 
if and only if for every  {1,2} i∈ , there exists a function  : {0} iiR µ + Ω → ∪  such  that 
(5)    
** * ** * () ()(|) ( ) ()(| )
ii ii
ii i ii i i ii i ii i i va f a va f a
ωω
µω ω µω ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
−= − ∑∑ , 
(6)    
** () ()(|) () ()(|)
ii ii
ii i ii i i ii i ii i i va f a va f a
ωω
µω ω µω ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
−≥ − ∑∑  for  all 
ii aA ∈ , and   11
(7)    
** * 0( ){ ( )( ) } ii iij ij wa wa µω δ ≤≤ −  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω . 
From the compactness and non-emptiness of the set of possible  i µ  satisfying (5), (6), 
and (7), we can define a value  ( ) ( ; ) ii ii R RR δ δ = Γ∈  as 
**
:{ 0 } max { ( ) ( ) ( | )}
ii
ii







∪   subject to (5), (6), and (7). 
The following proposition shows that  ( ) ii R δ  is regarded as the least upper bound of 
the tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player  {1,2} i∈ . 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that there exists a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium in  Γ, i.e., for 
each  {1, 2} i∈ , there exists a function  i µ  that satisfies (5), (6), and (7). Then, there 
exists a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ˆˆ (,) qs in Γ such  that 
    ˆˆ (,) ( ) ii i vq s Rδ =  for  all  {1, 2} i∈ . 
Moreover, for every tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  (,) qs in Γ, 
    (,) ( ) ii i vq s Rδ ≤  for  each  {1, 2} i∈ . 
 
Proof: From (2), for every tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ( , ) qs and  every  {1,2} i∈ , 
** * * * (,) ( ) { ( ) ( ) } { 1 ( ) }( | )
ii




≤− − − ∑ ; 
note that in the above equation, the function  i µ  defined  by 
** * () {() ( ) } { 1 () } ii iij ij ji wa wa s µ ωδ ω =− −  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω    12
satisfies (5), (6), and (7). This implies that  (,) ( ) ii i vq s Rδ ≤ . 
For each  {1,2} i∈ , there exists  ˆi µ   satisfying (5), (6), and (7) such that 
   
** ˆ () ()(|) ()
ii




−= ∑ . 
We can construct a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ˆˆ (,) qs in a manner that for every 
{1, 2} i∈ , 
    ˆ 1 i q = , and  ** *
ˆ () ˆ ()1











 for  all  ii ω ∈Ω . 
Clearly,  ˆˆ (,) ( ) ii i vq s Rδ =  for  each  {1, 2} i∈ .  Q.E.D. 
 
Remark 1 (Independence of Discount Factors): Given that the discount factors are 
sufficiently large, we can verify that the least upper bound  ( ; ) ii R δ Γ   for each player  i 
does not depend on  i δ   as follows. We define  i R R ∈    by 
**
:{ 0 } max { ( ) ( ) ( | )}
ii
ii







∪   subject to (5) and (6), 
where we must note that  i R    is independent of  i δ , and that  () ii i RR δ ≥   . If 
** * {() ( ) } iij ij wa wa δ −  is large enough for the restriction (7) not to be binding, then it 
holds that  ( ) ii i RR δ =   . Let  i δ   denote the minimal discount factor  i δ  such that 
() ii i RR δ =   . Since  ( ) ii R δ   is nondecreasing with respect to  i δ , we have shown that 
() () ii ii i R RR δδ ==      for  all  ii δ δ ≥   . 
   13
Remark 2 (Exchangeability): Proposition 1 implies that if ( , ) qs   is a Nash 
equilibrium in a repeated game  {1,2} (,,) iii i ufδ ∈ Γ= , then all tit-for-tat strategies for each 
player  i are the best responses to  (,) jj qs in any repeated game such that player  's i  
discount factor is the same as that of  Γ, i.e.,  i δ . This implies that the tit-for-tat Nash 
equilibrium notion satisfies the following strong property of exchangeability across 
different games. Consider three repeated games given by  {1,2} (,,) iii i ufδ ∈ Γ ≡ , 
{1,2} (, , ) ii i i ufδ ∈ ′′ ′′ Γ≡ , and  111222 (,,,, , ) uf uf δ δ ′′ ′ ′ ′ Γ= . If  (,) q s  is a Nash equilibrium in 
Γ and (,) qs ′′   is a Nash equilibrium in  ′ Γ , then  11 22 (,,,) qsqs ′ ′   is a Nash equilibrium 
in  ′′ Γ , where the payoffs are unchanged in that 
    11122 1 (,,,; ) (,;) vqsqs vqs ′′′ ′ ′′′ Γ= Γ and  21 122 1 (,,,; ) ( , ;) vqsqs vq s ′ ′′ ′ Γ =Γ . 
 
5. Approximate Efficiency 
We assume that for each  {1,2} i∈ , 
(8)    
** * * () () {() ( ) } ii ii i i j i j va va wa wa δ −< −  for  all 
* \{ } iii aAa ∈ , 
which is a necessary condition for (7), i.e., the existence of tit-for-tat Nash equilibria. 
Note that (8) is sufficient and (almost) necessary for the existence of the efficient 
tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium given that monitoring is perfect. We will show that (8) is 
also sufficient for the existence of the approximately efficient tit-for-tat Nash   14
equilibrium given that monitoring is almost perfect. 
Fix  0 ε >  arbitrarily, which is positive but close to zero. Assume that there exist 
*
ii Ω⊂ Ω and 
**
ii Ω⊂ Ω  such  that 
** *
























≤ ∑  for  all 








≤ ∑  for  all 
** \{ } iii aAa ∈ . 
This assumption along with a small  0 ε >  implies that the signals are accurate in 
monitoring. When player i chooses 
*
i a , it is almost certain that the signal  i ω  for 
player  's i  action choice belongs to 
*
i Ω . When player i chooses 
**
i a , it is almost 
certain that it belongs to 
**
i Ω . Hence, opponent  j  can almost perfectly monitor 
whether player  i has  chosen 
*
i a , 
**
i a , or other actions. 
  We specify the function  i µ  as 
** * () {() ( ) } ii iij ij wa wa µω δ =−  for  all 
** *
iii ω ∉ΩΩ ∪ , and 
    ( ) 0 ii µ ω =  for  all 
*
ii ω ∈Ω . 
By selecting  ( ) ii µ ω  from the interval 
** * [0, { ( ) ( )}] iij ij wa wa δ −  for each 
**
ii ω ∈Ω  in 






∈Ω ∑  close to zero. This implies that the least upper bound  () ii R δ  is 
approximated by 
* () i ua . Hence, we have proved that whenever the signals are   15
sufficiently accurate, efficiency is approximated by a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoff 
vector even if the discount factors are fixed and not very high. 
 
Theorem 3: If  0 ε >   is sufficiently close to zero and (8) holds for each  {1, 2} i∈ , then 
there exists a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium (,) qs  in  Γ  such  that  (,) vqs  is 
approximated by 
* () ua .  
 
6. Example 
Fix  1 (, 1 ) 2 p∈  and  (0,1) δ ∈  arbitrarily. We investigate an example where 
{0,1} i A = , {0,1} i Ω= , (1|1) (0|0) ii f fp == , and  i δ δ =  for each  {1,2} i∈ . The 
following matrix illustrates the component game, where we assume  0 ZY >>. Let 
* (1,1) a =  and 
** (0,0) a = . All the assumptions necessary for the results of this paper 
are satisfied, i.e., the payoff functions are additively separable, 
* a  is efficient, and the 
inequalities expressed in (1) hold. 
 
 1  0 
1 X X  X – Z X + Y 
0  X + Y X – Z  X + Y – Z X + Y – Z 
  
From the standard calculation, a tit-for-tat strategy profile  (,) qs satisfies (4) if   16
and only if 








 for  all  {1, 2} i∈ . 
This along with Proposition 1 implies that the inequalities given in (9) are necessary and 
sufficient for the tit-for-tat strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium. This implies that 
there exists a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ( , ) qs  if and only if 







Suppose that (10) holds. The standard calculation along with (2) implies that if 
(,) qs  is a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium, the payoff induced by  ( , ) qs equals 
1








=− −− − + −
−
. 
The average payoff of the players equals 
  
12 (,) (,) 1
22 1






12 1 2 (1) (1)





−− − + − . 
Then, it follows that if  ( , ) qs and ( , ) qs ′ ′   are tit-for-tat Nash equilibria and 
1212 qq qq ′′ +=+ and  1212 (1) (1) (1) (1) ss ss ′ ′ + =+, 
then the average payoffs are the same between  ( , ) qs and ( , ) qs ′ ′ , i.e., 
   
12 1 2 (,) (,) ( , ) ( , )
22
vq s vq s vqs vqs ′ ′′ ′ ++
= . 
Since the tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ˆˆ (,) qs specified by (9),  12 ˆˆ1 qq == , and 
12 ˆˆ (1) (1) 1 ss ==   induces the least upper bound  ( ) i R δ   for each player  i, it follows that 
   










  .   17
This along with Proposition 2 implies that the least upper bound is independent of the 










converges to the efficient payoff  X  as  p  approaches  unity. 
  In order to demonstrate the degree of implicit collusion in the long run, it is 
appropriate to exclude the payoffs in the early periods and concentrate on the stationary 




() ( ) ()()(| )
aA
aa s s f a
ω
ρρ ω ω ω
∈∈ Ω




() ( ) { 1 () } { 1 ( ) } ( | )
aA
aa s s f a
ω
ρρ ω ω ω
∈∈ Ω
=− − ∑ , 
** *
,
(, ) ( ) () { 1 () } (| ) ij ij ji
aA
aa a s s f a
ω
ρρ ω ω ω
∈∈ Ω
=− ∑ , 
and  () 0 a ρ =  for all 
* ** * ** ** *







= ∑  denote 
the relative frequency of player  's i  action  choice 
*
i a   in the long run. Note that 
** ** * * {1 } ij j j j KK ρ ρρ =+− , 
where  ** ()(|)
jj




≡ ∑  and  ** ** ()(| )
jj




≡ ∑ . Hence, 
** * ** **
*
** * ** *
()











In this example, the standard calculation along with (9) implies that 
   
* (1 )










   









and therefore,   18
   
*
22 2
{( 1 ) ( 1 )}
() ( 2 1 )
ji
i









The average relative frequency in the long run is expressed as 
   
** 12
12
{( 1 ) ( 1 ) }
2( ) ( )(2 1)









which depends only on  12 (1) (1) ss + . 
The least upper bound of the relative frequencies in the long run is achieved by the 
tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium  ˆˆ (,) qs  satisfying  12 ˆˆ (1) (1) 1 ss = = , and is equal to 
(2 1)







. Since this value is increasing with respect to δ , it follows that 
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